FACT, VALUE AND THEORY IN ANTITRUST
ADJUDICATION
HERBERT HOVENKAMP*

Once again, I thank the Duke Law Journal for providing space for a
brief answer to Professor Liebeler's response' to some of my earlier
work.

2

Professor Liebeler's title, "What are the Alternatives to Chicago?,"
is apparently a rhetorical question. Ostensibly the answer is "None." I
write a few lines merely to emphasize once again that the alternatives are
real, obvious, and even necessary to the preservation of antitrust in a
democratic society.
In Antitrust Policy After Chicago, I argued, at some length, that the
Chicago approach to antitrust analysis does not represent the "discovery" of an economic approach to antitrust, but rather a simple change in
economic models; 3 that the public, or policy, purpose of economics is not
to eliminate distributive justice as a concern, but only to enable policymakers to assess the social cost of alteruative policies; 4 that the neoclassical economic model used by the Chicago School exaggerates the ease
with which efficiency can be identified in the real world, and that when
efficiency becomes more difficult to identify political concerns loom relatively larger; 5 that Chicago School antitrust policy is just as "political" as
the alternatives; 6 that Chicago School antitrust, its claims to science
notwithstanding, rests on assumptions that are as unverifiable as the assumptions of others, and that the entire theory of the social cost of monopoly is ultimately unprovable; 7 that free riding may be so pervasive
that it is impossible to measure consumer preference from consumer behavior; 8 that one calmot construct an antitrust policy based exclusively
*
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on efficiency; 9 that the Chicago School refuses to take the legislative history of the antitrust laws seriously; 10 and that the Chicago School tends
to rely on static models which underestimate the extent of strategic behavior. II I concluded by defending the jury verdicts in two recent antitrust cases-Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. 12 and
Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. 13-arguing that both
cases involved plausible instances of anticompetitive strategic behavior. 14
In his response, Professor Liebeler discusses that conclusion alonemaking no reference to the other issues, which I believe to be far more
important. I assume by his silence that he agrees with me on all the
other points. If that is so, I do not know why we are bothering to debate
the rest.
I.

THE CONSUMER WELFARE MODEL, THEORETICAL

FACTS

AND

JURY PREROGATIVE

Professor Liebeler focuses on my defense of the juries' findings of
anticompetitive behavior in Aspen Skiing and Bonjorno. He concludes
that, as between alternative explanations for the defendant's behavior in
Aspen Skiing, the anticompetitive one "seems not to be the case"-even
assuming Aspen Skiing Company (Ski Co) was a monopolist. 15 He then
discusses Bonjorno in a similar way.1 6 My general response to Professor
Liebeler is something I have said before. 17 The question in both Aspen
Skiing and Bonjorno was not whether the plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on their records. If that had been the issue, I noted, I
would have had no trouble deciding that summary judgment was inappropriate.18 Rather, the question in both cases was whether there was a
conflict in the facts or in the theories from which juries are permitted to
choose, and whether the juries were entitled to accept a theory that condemned the defendants' activities.19 A unanimous Supreme Court in
Aspen Skiing,20 as well as the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in Bonjorno,21 answered yes to both questions.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 246-48.
Id. at 249-55.
Id. at 256-83.
472 U.S. 585 (1985).
752 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3284 (1986).
Hovenkamp, After Chicago, supra note 2, at 270-83.
Liebeler, supra note 1, at 808.
Id. at 814-15.
Hovenkamp, Alternatives, supra note 2, at 1015.
Id.
Id. at 1015-16.
472 U.S. at 587, 611.
752 F.2d at 811.
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Professor Liebeler suggests one explanation of defendant Ski Co's
possibly inefficient behavior-Ski Co was taking advantage of its and
22
Highlands' established positions to extract quasi-rents from Highlands.
He concludes, however, that this "seems not to be the case," for two of
Ski Co's mountains-Buttermilk and Snowmass-were facilities identical to Highlands. 23 I believe Professor Liebeler is wrong. Had the slopes
been identical, skiers would have been indifferent as to whether Highlands was included in the package with Buttermilk and Snowmass. For
example, a shopper purchasing a single box of crackers should be indifferent as to whether the store's inventory includes ten, fifty, or one hundred identical boxes-as long as she gets one. The Aspen Skiing Court,
however, cited evidence to the contrary. 24 The fact that customers believed Highlands was different from Ski Co's three mountains makes the
expropriation of quasi-rents at least theoretically possible. Highlands
needed Aspen to attract destination skiers; therefore Ski Co could force
an arrangement on Highlands that at the margin deprived Highlands of a
return on the fixed cost part of its investment. Presumably Highlands
would stop operating before agreeing to an arrangement that denied it
recovery of its variable costs. This supports the jury verdict in Aspen
Skiing even under Professor Liebeler's theory of antitrust, unless he believes that the strategic appropriation of quasi-rents should never be ille25
gal, even if it is inefficient.
But all of this misses the main point: Liebeler's conclusion that as
between alternative explanations the anticompetitive one "seems not to
be the case" is not preclusive on juries. Juries are generally entitled to
look at the same set of alternatives and vote the other way. Professor
Liebeler apparently believes that the "consumer welfare model"-upon
which he bases his analysis-describes a theory of antitrust that is so
determinate and uncontroversial that the only role remaining to juries is
22. Liebeler, supra note 1, at 808-09.
23. Id.
24. 472 U.S. at 606.
25. For an analysis of quasi-rent appropriation, see Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, AppropriableRents, and the Competitive ContractingProcess, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978). A
mere extraction of quasi-rents, provided it is computed precisely, is a wealth transfer and has no
welfare effects other than transaction costs. Transaction costs, however, in settings where quasirents can be extracted may be very high. Bilateral monopoly is one such situation. See R. BLAIR &
D. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL 31-36 (1983)
(introducing mathematical model to prove that total industry profits decrease due to "successive
monopoly"). But see Friedman, Antitrust Analysis andBilateral Monopoly, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 873,
906-08 (Each firm in a bilateral monopoly is "likely to realize that if it bargains on both price and
quantity a beneficial deal is more likely."). Joint ownership of a monopoly facility, as the Court
presumed to be the case in Aspen Skiing, is another situation in which transaction costs may be very
high. For similar situations, see Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 55,
69-88 (1987).
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to decide disputed adjudicative facts, such as which of two witnesses was
telling the truth. I believe that, even in antitrust cases, juries continue to
have a broader role in fact determination.
The core of my disagreement with Professor Liebeler has to do with
the relative role of fact, theory and jury prerogative in antitrust policy.
As a basic premise, of course, juries decide issues of fact in jury trials.
Admittedly, we sometimes take questions about adjudicative facts 26that is, facts about the parties in the case-away from antitrust juries
because we say that no reasonable jury could ever find in the plaintiff's
favor on the particular set of facts. The Supreme Court and the Third
Circuit found Aspen Skiing and Bonjorno not to be such cases.
But was a rational juror entitled to conclude from the adjudicative
facts in Aspen Skiing and Bonjorno that the defendants' behavior was
anticompetitve, inefficient, or socially harmful? 27 Deciding this depends
not only on the jurors' perception of the adjudicative facts, but also on
their entitlement to rely on a more abstract set of facts that concern the
economic consequences of specific behavior.
A.

TheoreticalFacts.

Both Aspen Skiing and Bonjorno involve relatively complex factsbut even more complex and controversial economic theories. Aspen Skiing involves a firm's strategic behavior directed at competitors. Bonjorno
involves the relationship between vertical integration, sunk costs, quasirents and the resulting opportunities for strategic behavior. Professor
Liebeler has offered an interpretation of the facts and a set of theories
suggesting that the juries in both cases were wrong and that the defendants should have won. 28 Although I find Liebeler's explanations relatively attractive and quite reasonable, he fails to address the real issue
respecting the use of economic theory in litigation-whether the juries
were obliged to accept Liebeler's theories or some other theories that do
not fit into the prevailing model quite as well. I suggest two things here.
First, judges must invariably control theory to a substantial degree, and
second, within a fairly broad range, juries must nevertheless have the
right to select among competing theories just as they select among competing adjudicative facts.
On a fundamental level, theories look more like facts than law-but
at a much higher level of abstraction than are most common facts. Theoretical statements purport to be descriptive of the world, not statements
26. See 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.3, at 143-46 (2d ed. 1980).
27. In more legal terms, the issue is whether a rational juror was entitled to believe that the
defendants had monopolized or attempted to monopolize certain markets.
28. Liebeler, supra note 1, at 805-10, 812-15.
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of rules made by the sovereign. Because facts generally go to the jury
and I am defending the jury verdicts in Aspen Skiing and Bonjorno, I
might be tempted to let the matter rest with the observation that theories
are more like facts than like law. I cannot, however, because the question is too complicated and interesting.
"Legislative" facts and, in the case of judge made law, "judgmental"
facts are also highly abstract. 29 When dealing with these facts, federal
judges are permitted (but not required) to resolve conflicts themselves,
consulting any authority, whether produced by the parties or from some
other source. 30 Juries, however, may also resolve such conflicts.
Theoretical propositions that appear to be descriptive of the real
world are within the realm of judgmental facts. These propositions look
like assertions but are much more abstract than the particular facts of the
case. At the risk of misstating Professor Liebeler's position, he appears
to suggest two theoretical propositions about Aspen Skiing and Bonjorno:
(1) a monopolist's refusal to deal with a weaker competitor is never socially costly, and (2) a firm's refusal to deal with a vertically related firm
is never socially costly.3 1 If these two statements are so incontrovertibly
true that juries should not be permitted to decide to the contrary, then
Mr. Liebeler's criticisms of Aspen Skiing and Bonjorno are correct. I do
not believe that either statement falls into that category.
Admittedly these propositions are different from the facts commonly in dispute in litigation, such as "was the dog provoked" or "did
the defendant fall asleep at the wheel." Nevertheless, they are factual in
that they purport to describe the world. What makes these two factual
statements problematic, however, is that, given the current state of economic science, they cannot be verified or falsified. Mr. Liebeler might
feel very strongly that they are true, and he might be able to design a
model illustrating them to be true, but other, equally reasonable people
might employ a different model that allows some exceptions to the two
statements. 32 Still others might decide that as basic propositions the two
statements are simply wrong. Juries must be permitted to choose among
conflicting theoretical propositions-just as they choose among alternative explanations in other factual disputes.
29. See 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 26, § 15.10, at 178. Judgmental facts are facts "mixed with
judgment, policy ideas, opinion, discretion or philosophical preference." Id.
30. See FED. R. EvID. 201 advisory committee's note to subdivision (b).
31. To this second proposition, one may wish to add the clause "unless the refusal to deal
facilitates horizontal collusion." One also may wish to add further refinements or qualifications, or
perhaps to substitute the word "anticompetitive" or "inefficient" for the words "socially costly," but
such changes would not be germane to my point.
32. E.g., Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve
Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

B.

[Vol. 1987:897

The Consumer Welfare ModeL

The consumer welfare principle-articulated by a popularizer of
Chicago-style neoclassicism, Robert Bork 3 3 -is undoubtedly one of the
two or three greatest epithets in the antitrust lexicon. But there is considerable sleight of hand in Judge Bork's statement of the principle and
in the way other Chicagoans use it. As a general statement of the goal of
the antitrust laws, the consumer welfare principle is indisputably true.
Beyond that point, however, the analytic value of the principle becomes
much more diffuse. The consumer welfare principle does not dictate that
neoclassical models are better than postclassical ones. It tells us only
that productive efficiency is good and that the antitrust laws should maximize allocative efficiency without disturbing productive efficiency any
more than necessary. 34 Such a directive is little more than the economists' version of "do justice."
Nevertheless, Professor Liebeler attacks me for not adhering to the
consumer welfare principle. He fails to understand that the consumer
welfare principle itself is indeterminate with respect to many issues, including those in Aspen Skiing and Bonjorno. As the discussion below
reveals, 3 5 the consumer welfare principle can even be indeterminate with
respect to one of the Chicago School's favorite theories-resale price
maintenance to control free riding by marginal dealers is efficient because
36
it increases welfare.
C.

The JudicialRole.

A difficult question that needs to be worked out-and this essay offers no more than a statement of the problem-is what the role of the
generalist judge should be in turning questions about economic theory
into questions of law or matters of policy where the legislature has not
incorporated a particular theory into the statute at issue. 37 In other
33. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978).
34. See id.at 91.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 50-64.
36. See R. BORK, supra note 33, at 280-98.
37. On the problem in general, see FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S.
775, 813-14 (1978); 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 26, § 15.9; Davis, "There is a Book Out. .. ": An
Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1547-92 (1987);

Monahan & Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in
Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 498-508 (1986).
Questions of theory in private plaintiff actions under the Sherman Act are particularly tricky.
The statute is dated and short, and Congress has told us almost nothing about the kind of economic
theory that should be employed in determining when behavior violates the statute. Judge Bork has
suggested that the framers of the Sherman Act wrote neoclassical economic theory and its concept of
efficiency into the Sherman Act. See R. BORK, supra note 33, at 56-71 (overriding policy goal
behind Sherman Act is consumer welfare); Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman
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words, when should the judge decide that the court, rather38than the jury,
should determine whether these "facts" are true or false?
Several possible rules might govern the judge's role respecting matters of theory: (1) questions of theory should always be a matter of law;
or (2) a jury should be entitled to select among conflicting theories as
long as each theory is at least minimally plausible; or (3) matters of theory are ordinarily questions of fact but may become questions of law if a
theoretical issue becomes sufficiently well settled that the plausibility of
alternatives is not worth litigating.
A strong case can be made for the third choice-turning theory
questions into questions of law once the theoretical issue becomes wellsettled. Too many academics (not only Chicagoans), however, at least
implicitly prefer the first choice 39-treating all theory questions as matters of law-because it gives prettier results.
The problems associated with changing theory questions into questions of law are particularly acute in antitrust matters because of the
indeterminate nature of economic policy statements. Within a particular
model based on a given set of assumptions, it can be quite easy-and
extraordinarily convincing-to draw a conclusion such as "resale price
maintenance is never anticompetitive unless it facilitates collusion," or
"creation of monopoly by predatory pricing is impossible." But these
statements are themselves neither verifiable nor falsifiable, and neither
are the models from which they are derived. At one time or another,
economists or groups of economists in power may dispute these statements or assent to them with varying degrees of enthusiasm, but this is as
much a function of which way the political or academic winds are blowing as of empirical certainty.
Despite the problems associated with changing questions of theory
into questions of law, judges have a wide range of mechanisms available
to take issues of theory away from juries. One of the most controversial
mechanisms in aiititrust litigation has been summary judgment. In two
recent decisions, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 7-8 (1966) (goal of Sherman Act is maximization of wealth). Judge Bork's
view, however, has not withstood criticism very well. See generally Hovenkamp, After Chicago,
supra note 2, at 249-50 ("legislative histories of the various antitrust laws fail to exhibit anything
resembling a dominant concern for economic efficiency"); Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original
and Primary Concern ofAntitrust: The Efficiency InterpretationChallenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65,
83-89 (1982) (arguing it is very unlikely that in 1890 Congress understood the impact of monopoly
power on consumer welfare).
38. For a proposal that social science data should be treated as "social authority" and the
judge's conclusions as conclusions of law, see Monahan & Walker, supra note 37, at 495-517.
39. For a generalized argument on the first proposition, see id. at 478-79.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1987:897

Corp.4 0 and Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.,4 1 the Supreme
Court has developed a rule for summary judgment in antitrust cases-to
avoid unfavorable summary judgment, the plaintiff must produce evidence that makes it "more likely than not" that its version of things is
true.
Unfortunately, Matsushita and Cargill tell us little about how this
rule applies to questions of theory rather than questions of adjudicative
fact. The rule seems to apply best to adjudicative facts. For example, to
avoid summary judgment in a case alleging conspiracy among the defendants, the plaintiff must present evidence suggesting that "more likely
than not" the defendants were conspiring. Even here, however, theory is
important. Agreement can be inferred from market conduct, and such
inferences might depend on fairly complex theoretical analyses of the rationality of firm behavior. r2 Some footnotes in Cargill suggest that the
summary judgment standard applies equally to theory and adjudicative
facts. 43 For example, a plaintiff who is trying to avoid summary judgment by showing that "more likely than not" a merger will facilitate
predatory pricing must produce some structural evidence that predatory
pricing in the post merger market is plausible. On the theory that only
dominant firms with available capacity and in markets with high entry
barriers will pursue predatory pricing, part of the evidence would deal
with entry barriers, excess capacity, and the market share of the post
merger firm.
Neither Matsushita nor Cargillcan be read to say that to avoid summary judgment one must show that a particular theory of predatory pricing or vertical integration or resale price maintenance is "more likely
than not" true. Rather, the decisions suggest that theory often becomes
so well established that it dictates the kinds of facts that must be
presented in an antitrust case. For example, today almost no one believes
that predatory pricing is plausible except by dominant firms in markets
with high entry barriers. This has prompted several tribunals to incorporate these beliefs into their predatory-pricing standards. 44 Finding that
40. 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986).
41. 107 S. Ct. 484, 491-94 (1986).
42. Matsushita involved such a theory. See 475 U.S. at 588-98; see also Apex Oil Co. v.
DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 253-60 (2d Cir.) (alleging conspiracy that made performance of heating oil
futures contracts impractical and expensive for plaintiff), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 489 (1987).
43. 107 S. Ct. at 494 nn.15-17. Cargill involved a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
The plaintiff never specifically alleged predatory pricing although the Court developed the theory of
predatory pricing from the plaintiff's complaint. The Court essentially applied a summary judgment
standard, concluding that "[e]ven had Monfort actually advanced a claim of predatory pricing, we
doubt whether the facts as found by the District Court would have supported it." Id. at 494 n. 15.
The Court then discussed the theoretical basis for predatory pricing. Id.
44. See P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUsT LAW 711.2b (1987 Supp.).
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well-established theory dictates the fact presentation of a particular case,
however, is quite different from saying, for example, that among three
conflicting but plausible theories the plaintiff must show that one is
"more likely than not" the best explanation of the facts. In this sense,
conflicting theories are like conflicting facts. Difficult as it may be, juries
must choose among them.
Despite this reasoning, both judges and academics face a strong
temptation to turn questions of theory into questions of law. They believe that the litigation process creates more predictable results in that
way and minimizes the need for long, drawn-out trials in which experts
are cross-examined and juries are left bewildered.
Antitrust may be anomalous in this respect. Policy shifts in antitrust go through relatively wide and frequent swings. One can be sure,
for example, that if President Reagan is succeeded by a Democrat, someone greatly different from Bill Baxter will be named to head the Antitrust
Division and people with different outlooks than Judges Posner, Bork,
and Easterbrook will be nominated to the federal courts. These policy
changes contribute greatly to the lack of predictability in antitrnst law.
One has only to consider the fate of Warren Court antitrust jurisprudence since 1977.45 Juries, on the other hand, are selected more or less at
random, and there is no particular reason to think that a jury selected
during a Republican administration is very different from one selected
during a Democratic administration. Within a single administration or
antitrust regime, a relatively high number of rules of law may increase
the predictability and consistency of antitrust adjudication. Over the
long haul, however, we would probably have more stability if we left
more things to juries.
One argument that theoretical facts should be treated as presenting
questions of law is that such facts would then be reviewable de novo on
appeal, because they are stated as conclusions of law. Adjudicative facts,
on the other hand, are reviewable under a clearly erroneous standard,
which permits the appellate court to second guess only irrational fact
findings. Proponents of the argument for treating all theoretical issues as
questions of law argue that trial judges should not be able to make economic or antitrust policy and insulate that policy from review by disguis'46
ing it as merely "factual."
But their argument overlooks the fact that appellate courts as well
as trial courts are able to employ judgmental facts-in fact, appellate
45. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (Burger Court adopts
rule of reason for vertical nonprice restraints).
46. For a critique, see M. Saks, Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works: A Critique of
"An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts" (unpublished manuscript).
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courts probably do so more often. Furthermore, trial judges decide matters of legislative fact by not deciding them. The instant the trial judge in
Aspen Skiing permitted the case to go to the jury, she had decided,
whether or not she knew it, not to accept as a judgmental fact the proposition that "a monopolist's refusal to deal with a competitor is never socially costly." Either the court of appeals or the Supreme Court could
later have disagreed and adopted a rule of law that would not allow such
a question to go to the jury. In essence, the Supreme Court determined
that the proposition was one upon which the jury was entitled to pass.
When a higher court gives such propositions to a jury it is simply
conceding that it is not yet ready to turn the proposition into a rule of
law, or part of the economic policy of antitrust. While this may produce
some inconsistent results, over the long run it will produce no more inconsistency than if the antitrust courts of one regime adopt a particular
policy rule while those of a different regime replace it with another.
If the theory in question is relatively uncontroversial, I believe
judges should be willing to turn statements of theory into judgmental
facts and thus into conclusions of law. Here, I suspect, is where a big
part of my difference with Professor Liebeler lies. He has a high degree
of faith in the neoclassical model, and he has used it to "demonstrate" all
kinds of propositions about the consequences of vertical arrangements,
pricing policies, horizontal integration, etc. 4 7 I agree with him about
48
most of these things.
But Liebeler has considerably less patience than I have with the possibility that other models, which appear just as rational to some people,
can yield sharply different policy conclusions. The ideally democratic
solution, of course, would be to convince Congress to legislate policies
more explicitly. Unfortunately, because Congress has not been all that
helpful, 49 the judge is obliged to determine policy in an area where he is
not necessarily that much better than the jury in deciding what the policy
47. E.g., Liebeler, 1984 Economic Review of Antitrust Developments: Horizontal Restrictions,
Efficiency, and the Per Se Rule, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1019 (1986); Liebeler, 1983 Economic Review of
Antitrust Developments: The Distinction Between Price and Nonprice Distribution Restrictions, 31
UCLA L. REV. 384 (1983); Liebeler, Intrabrand"Cartels" Under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA L. REV.
1 (1982).
48. See, eg., H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 9.2, at 249-50
(1985) (discussing economics of resale price maintenance and citing Liebeler).
49. Congress continues to suggest that it prefers the per se rule for resale price maintenance,
and it continues to balk at substantial antitrust reform as proposed by the Reagan administration.
For example, in 1983 Congress placed a rider in the Antitrust Division's budget preventing the
Division from arguing for the rule of reason in future private plaintiff resale price maintenance cases.
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-166, § 510, 97 Stat. 1071, 1102-03 (1983).
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should be and where mere rationality does not command one policy over
all others.
Nevertheless, as dangerous and antidemocratic as it is, I am willing
to accept the proposition that judges must intervene frequently with a
policy decision, provided that the asserted policy is relatively uncontroversial among the relevant community of experts. Antitrust is fairly
filled with such policy-based rules of law. For example, antitrust rules
state that only dominant firms can be found guilty of monopolization,
naked price fixing is socially costly, and mergers of firms with very small
market shares are harmless. When substantial controversy exists in the
expert community, however, it is better not to turn questions of theoretical fact into propositions of law too quickly. The Aspen Skiing and
Bonjorno propositions stated above fall into that category.
II.

HARD THEORIES AND INDETERMINATE MODELS

One problem with economic theories is that verifying or falsifying
them is very difficult, often impossible. Professor Liebeler relies heavily, 50 as I do, 51 on a neoclassical model that illustrates quite easily that
vertical arrangements are competitive except when they facilitate upstream or downstream collusion. But being able to diagram this result
and being able to prove it are not the same thing. Important questions,
such as whether output increases or decreases when resale price maintenance or a nonprice restraint is imposed, have proven distressingly difficult to answer. It is too difficult to isolate all the relevant variables. The
empirical studies I know about have been elaborate, conjectural, inconclusive, and, worse yet, have tended to undermine the model as often as
they support it.52
Perhaps even more serious is the problem of naive oversimplification
that our models lead us to so easily., For example, ever since Professor
50. See sources cited supra note 47.
51. See, eg., H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 48, §§ 8.1-9.4 (discussing tie-in and resale price
maintenance arrangements).
52. See BUREAU OF COMPETITION, BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION VERTICAL RESTRAINIS CASES, (R. Lafferty, R. Lande & J. Kirkwood, eds. 1984); T. OVERSTREET, RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: EcoNOMIC THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE (Bureau of Economics Staff Report to the Federal
Trade Commissioner 1983); see also Comanor & Frech, The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements?, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 539 (1985) (investigating implications of vertical agreement requiring
exclusive dealings between distributor and manufacturer); Marvel & McCafferty, Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification, 15 RAND J. ECON. 346 (1984) (explaining use of resale price
maintenance where no presale dealer services required); Mathewson & Winter, An Economic Theory
of Vertical Restraints, 15 RAND J. ECON. 27 (1984) (discussing externalities justifying use of vertical
restraints).
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Telser's pathbreaking article in 1960, 53 it has become commonplace for
antitrust scholars to assert that resale price maintenance and, by the
same general reasoning, nonprice restraints can be used to control freerider problems. Liebeler obviously accepts this literature and tries to use
it against me.5 4 I myself have accepted it. 55 Telser provided the basic
material for the diagram in Figure One, which has undoubtedly appeared
10,000 times in hornbooks, law review articles and antitrust classrooms.
Figure One illustrates that resale price maintenance (RPM), designed to
control free riding, can actually be efficient because it increases output.
FIGURE ONE

PRICE

0 2 D,

D2

QUANTITY

D, shows the demand curve for a product before RPM is imposed.
Output is equal to 01, and consumers' surplus 56 is equal to triangle 2-6-7.
The resale price is C1. When RPM is imposed at price C2, dealers' costs
53. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want FairTrade?, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 86 (1960).
54. Liebeler, supra note 1, at 811, 817.
55. See, eg., H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 48, § 9.2, at 252-56.
56. Consumers' surplus is equal to the difference between the collective value that consumers
place on a product and the amount they must pay for it.
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increase to that level as they compete against each other for sales by
offering more point-of-sale services, making larger fixed-cost investments
in facilities, and so on. Demand increases in response to these dealer
investments. D 2 , which is parallel to D1, shows the demand curve after
RPM is imposed. The curve is shifted to the right to illustrate the increased value that customers place on the additional services that result
from RPM. Output has now increased to 02, higher than it was before
RPM, even though price is also higher. Consumers are willing to pay
more if they get more in return. Consumers' surplus under RPM equals
triangle 1-3-5.
This is an impressive piece of geometry. I can remember being fairly
awestruck when I was first exposed to it in law school in late 1977-the
same semester that the Supreme Court decided Continental T. V, Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 5 7 applying a rule of reason to vertical nonprice restraints. Yet-particularly in the absence of corroborating empirical evidence which has proven elusive-how much does the diagram tell about
the real world? The answer, I now believe, is not very much.
Ever since the publication of Telser's 1960 article,58 advocates of the
free-rider argument for RPM have generally assumed that demand
curves D1 (before RPM) and D2 (under RPM) were parallel. This assumption reflects the rather odd belief that all customers place precisely
the same value on the increased point-of-sale services that RPM produces. As a matter of geometry, it can be shown that if demand curves
D1 and D 2 are parallel, RPM that increases output will also increase consumers' surplus.5 9 Relying on models like this, some writers virtually
60
equate increases in output with increases in efficiency.
As an empirical matter, the assumption of parallel demand curves
seems heroic at best, ludicrous at worst. Some recent literature, particularly by Professors Comanor and Scherer, 61 illustrates this. As a practical illustration, consider the market for personal computers. Some
"marginal" consumers 62 will have to be educated about why they need a
57. 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).

58. Telser, supra note 53.
59. The simplest way to illustrate this is by looking at the horizontal dotted line a-b on the
graph, which illustrates what would occur if RPM raised price to such a level that output was
precisely the same under RPM as before. In that case, the consumers' surplus triangle under RPM,
I-a-b, is precisely the same size as the consumers' surplus triangle before RPM, 2-6-7. Since triangle
1-3-5 is larger than triangle 1-a-b, it follows that consumers' surplus has increased under RPM.
60. See, eg., Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J.
135, 140 (1984) (arguing that output-increasing vertical restraints are procompetitive).
61. See, eg., Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REv. 983, 992-98 (1985); Scherer, The Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52
ANTITRUST L.J. 687, 700 n.23 (1983).
62. Marginal consumers are those who place the lowest value on the product.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1987:897

computer, what kind of computer they need, and how to operate it.
Other consumers-perhaps business firms that own half a dozen personal
computers and want to purchase more-already know exactly what they
need. For them, the point-of-sale services are a waste of money. Figure
Two depicts the more realistic assumption that different consumers value
point-of-sale services at different amounts, and that the marginal consumers' surplus will increase the most from the point-of-sale services. In
other words, marginal consumers are those most in need of the educational and other services supplied by the dealer.
FIGURE

Two

PRICE

5
C2

\7

010

2

D,

D2
QUANTITY

Figure Two is like Figure One except that the shifted demand curve
D 2, reflecting demand under RPM, is no longer parallel to Di. Rather, it
suggests that marginal consumers-those relatively low on the demand
curve-profit greatly from RPM. On the other hand, high-value consumers-those higher on the demand curve-profit relatively less from
the kinds of services offered by RPM, and at the margin-the very topthey may not profit at all.
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Most importantly, once we throw away the assumption of parallel
demand curves, the welfare effects of RPM become indeterminate. In
Figure Two, the RPM increases output, but there is no necessary connection between output and efficiency. The efficiency of a practice is generally equal to the amount of economic surplus that it creates-the sum of
consumers' surplus and producers' surplus. Although output has increased under RPM, consumers' surplus may actually have been reduced. Before RPM was in place, consumers' surplus equalled triangle
1-6-7. Under RPM, consumers' surplus is triangle 1-3-5, which in this
particular illustration is smaller than triangle 1-6-7. Assuming that the
manufacturer is earning monopoly profits, its surplus is larger by the distance from 01 to 02 times the monopoly profits it is earning, but this may
not be enough to offset the reduction in consumers' surplus. The dealers,
which are in fierce competition with each other, are not earning a surplus, for they are competing away the higher retail price in increased
point-of-sale services. As a result, RPM may be inefficient, even though
it is being used to combat free riding and, importantly, supplier output is
higher under RPM than it had been before.
What does Figure Two prove? I make no grandiose claims for Figure Two, except this one: Figure Two proves that Figure One did not
prove very much. Twenty-five years of theoretical argument supporting
a rule of per se legality in RPM cases, it turns out, probably rested on a
mistaken assumption about the shapes of demand curves.
Clearly the Chicago view on RPM is not ready to be turned into a
rule of per se legality. 63 Read together, Figures One and Two suggest
that, as a matter of economics alone, 64 RPM should be governed by a
rule of reason and the suppliers' market power ought to be an important
ingredient in judicial analysis under that rule. The consumers in Figure
Two who do not place a high value on point-of-sale services can be
forced to pay for them only if there are no lower-priced alternatives.
There would be no such alternatives only if the manufacturer imposing
RPM had substantial market power or the manufacturers in the market
were using RPM collusively.
This illustration also suggests that economic theory in antitrust
cases must be wielded more like a scalpel and less like an axe. Theory is
important to cut away those large areas about which there has been wide63. Cf.Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se
Legality, 48 U. Cw. L. REV. 6, 23,25 (1981) (arguing that vertical restrictions on distribution should
be declared legal per se).
64. I, perhaps unlike Professor Liebeler, believe that courts should continue to apply a rule of
per se illegality, not because it is supported by any particular economic model, but because Congress
continues to command it. See Hovenkamp, After Chicago,supra note 2, at 250-54.
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spread agreement and little coherent dissent. For example, unilateral
conduct by firms not possessing monopoly power should be legal per se
and naked price fixing should be illegal per se. Within the realm of the
rule of reason, however, where both Aspen Skiing and Bonjorno lie, a
broad range of theoretical questions must be treated as questions of fact.
Admittedly, we will not always like the outcomes. We have our pet theories which we hold with religious fervor and cannot believe that any rational person would think differently. But losing once in a while is part
of the price of democracy, and economists-certainly not any particular
group of economists-are not yet the dictators of American antitrust policy. In my view, that is about all the "rehabilitation" 65 that Aspen Skiing
and Bonjorno need.
With Professor Areeda, 166-like Professor Liebeler 67-have expressed doubt about the market definition in Aspen Skiing. That issue,
however, is irrelevant here. The market definition question was not preserved and was not before the Supreme Court. Given that fact, I believe
that the Supreme Court was correct not to permit any doubts it may have
had about the relevant market to color its analysis of the jury's right to
find monopolistic conduct. Even Chicago School judges agree that judicial economy is a sufficient defense for such a rule, regardless of whether
it benefits plaintiffs or defendants in antitrust cases. 68 The relevant policy question at this point is not whether Ski Co was an illegal monopolist,
but whether future firms that do have monopoly power can be condemned for doing what Ski Co did.

III.

ON RAISING RIVALS' COSTS AND THE PER SE RULE

I am perplexed by Professor Liebeler's criticism of my suggestion
that no one has ever provided a rational efficiency explanation for contracts in which "a supplier promises to charge higher prices to the con69
tracting firm's competitors than it charges to the contracting firm."
Liebeler suggests that the efficiency explanation is both rational and obvi65. See Liebeler, supra note 1, at 801.
66. See P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 44, 518.1h.
67. See Liebeler, supra note 1, at 811.
68. See, e.g., Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985)
(reversing Judge Posner's decision that res judicata barred federal antitrust claim in wake of prior
Illinois state court judgment on same facts); Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors
Ass'n, Inc., 814 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.) (holding that judicial economy would be
best served if one who opted out of a class action was not later given the benefit of offensive collateral
estoppel).
69. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Restricted Distribution, and the Market for Exclusionary
Rights, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1317 (1987).
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ous-to discourage free riding by marginal resellers. 70
Professor Liebeler misreads my statement. I proposed per se condemnation of agreements under which a supplier promises "to charge
higher prices to the contracting firm's competitors. '7 1 Liebeler responds
by concluding that there might be an efficiency explanation for a contract
that commands a higher price to a particularfree-riding competitor. The
argument I made and the one he attacks are very different. Conceding
for the moment that in Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.72 it
might have been efficient for Broadway-Hale to contract with Maytag for
higher prices to Klor's, a free-riding neighbor, that contract is altogether
different from an arrangement in which Broadway-Hale obtains a commitment from Maytag to charge higher prices to every retailer in San
Francisco. The latter practice creates a price umbrella that permits the
retailer to raise its own price as well.
Even as Professor Liebeler misreads my statement, it is not obviously wrong. Giving Professor Liebeler the benefit of every doubt, I suppose that we may be quibbling about the word "efficient." Choosing
among a half-dozen arrangements, the one that results in the second largest welfare loss is admittedly "efficient" by comparison with the one that
produces the largest welfare loss. There are several obvious solutions to
the Klor's free-rider problem that Liebeler describes: (1) resale price
maintenance, illegal per se but nevertheless often efficient; (2) territorial
or locational restrictions; (3) refusals to deal with free riders; (4) contractual requirements of point-of-sale services; and (5) more complete vertical integration into retailing. Professor Liebeler's suggestion that a
contract between the full-service dealer and a supplier requiring the supplier to charge more to a free-riding dealer is "efficient" may mean no
more than that it is not the most harmful of these alternatives. But such
a contract poses extraordinary problems for the supplier. The supplier
must compute the price differential precisely. If he calculates it too high,
he may create a price umbrella that will permit the full-service dealer to
charge higher prices at the supplier's expense. 7 3 If the supplier charges
too little, he wi]l not eliminate the free riding but will only reduce it.
Importantly, a policy of differential pricing as Professor Liebeler describes it is best for the supplier whether or not he does so by agreement
with one or more dealers. Perhaps some high-quality, full-service retailers will refuse to carry a product unless they can be guaranteed a certain
amount of protection from free riding. This explains many vertical price
70.
71.
72.
73.

Liebeler, supra note 1, at 817.
Hovenkamp, supra note 69, at 1317.
359 U.S. 207 (1959).
Assuming, of course, that competition does not restrain them.
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maintenance agreements and territorial or other distributional restraints.
It might even be efficient for a dealer to insist that competing dealers who
do not advertise or who do no warranty work must pay a premium for
the product. It still escapes me, however, why it would be efficient for
one dealer and a supplier to agree that another, particular supplier be
charged higher prices, even if that supplier is currently engaged in substantial free riding. By "efficient" here I mean not that the solution is not
the worst possible one, but rather that one could not come up with a
better one-or one equally good and clearly less anticompetitive-with
just a few moments thought.
All of this is quibbling, however, because in addition to misreading
my statement, Professor Liebeler did not address my real point. My
point was not that no one could ever concoct a plausible efficiency explanation of a contract in which a supplier promises one dealer that it will
charge higher prices to its competitors. Rather, my contention was that
such contracts should be illegal per se under the antitrust laws-the risks
are simply too high when compared with dangers to competition that are
relatively obvious.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Professor Liebeler suggests that a good Chicagoan should take comfort in the fact that while neither John Wiley nor I agree with Chicago,
neither do we agree with each other. That argument is supported by
neither logic nor experience-quite the contrary. Absence of debate and
controversy is far more characteristic of dead orthodoxy than of new
ideas. The Chicago School is not dead orthodoxy. It is a worthy opponent, and like most worthy opponents, the Chicago School is attacked by
liberals, Marxists, institutionalists, Austrians and evangelicals, most of
whom disagree with each other across a wide range of ideas. So much
the better for the debate.

